Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)... Over belangen... Sur l'intérêt général...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Investor-state_dispute_settlement:

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Debates

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Much debate[4][5] has arisen concerning the impact of ISDS on the capacity of governments to implement reforms and legislative and policy programs related to public health, environmental protection and human rights.[6]

Opponents argue that investor state claims (or the threat of them) inhibit the capacity of domestic governments (the "policy space") to pass legislation addressing perfectly legitimate public concerns, such as health and environmental protection, labour rights or human rights. Proponents of ISDS argue that states and their governments are bound by public international law, which includes bilateral investment treaties and international investment agreements. Under this view, the "right to regulate" has not been "lost" by the states, but on the contrary has been consciously designed by states not to allow for breach of investor's protected rights. The accession to instruments of public international law guaranteeing such rights is an exercise of democratic constitutional power and binds the acceding state, even if its future government changes. In this perspective, they say, future governments who feel "undemocratically restricted" in their "policy space" had better remember that it is the act of a democratically elected former government that binds them[citation needed]. On the other hand, it may contradict principles of democratic accountability to allow one government to bind another for decades to come. Unlike the great majority of other treaties, investment treaties have very long minimum lifespans ranging up to 30 years.

Opponents also argue that arbitrations are sometimes carried out in secret by trade lawyers who do not enjoy the typical safeguards of judicial independence and procedural fairness, who earn income only if a case is brought and proceeds, and who are not accountable to the public or required to take into account broader constitutional and international law human rights norms.[7] Proponents of ISDS point out that confidentiality is a standard feature of all arbitration and one that enables a constructive, de-politicized and fact-oriented atmosphere of dispute resolution. On the other hand, such traditional confidentiality is limited to disputes that affect the parties in question and not the broader public.

Also, most ICSID awards, although confidential, are de facto published by consent of the parties. However, many awards under other arbitration rules are not public and, in the case of investor-arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce, there is a requirement for blanket confidentiality for all aspects of a case.

It is further pointed out that judges are not elected in most countries outside the US, so that "public accountability of judges" may not be considered a standard of public international law. In any event, they say, the qualification of ISDS arbitrators matches or excels the qualification of most court judges[citation needed]. In response, critics make the point that any judge, whether domestic or international, who is part of a legal system not shown to be systematically biased or unreliable, has a greater claim to independence than an arbitrator because they judge enjoys secure tenure and a set salary, is insulated from conflicts of interest that arise when arbitrators work on the side as lawyers, and is assigned cases in any objective rather than by the discretion of a disputing party or an executive official.

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Investor-state_dispute_settlement.

Pour revenir quand même au sujet qui préoccupe ce blog en priorité: De la bonne utilisation de la technologie, des industries dites créatives et la protection des populations, en particulier des plus vulnérables, et de l'environnemnent.

DeuX articles:

- dans la presse néerlandaise: "Ruzie over oplossen van ruzies - Handelsverdrag Europa-Amerika - Hoe bescherm je belangen van investeerders? Daarover hebben VS en Europa ruzie. De VS willen speciale tribunalen voor geschillen. De Europese Commissie is tegen. Zij heeft een hoger doel: herstel van vertrouwen van de burgers in de Europese politiek" in NRC Handelsblad - "Economie"- le 15 octobre 2014.

- dans la presse française: "Principe de précaution: une polémique inutile - La prudence peut être plus rentable que l'inaction" pa Thierry Weil, professeur à Mines Paris Tech, coauteur d'une note de la Fabrique de l'industrie, "Précaution et compétitivité: deux exigences compatibles?", Presse des Mines, septembre 2014. In Le Monde - "Idées"- le 16 octobre 2014.

Les décideurs publics sont soumis à l'énorme pression d'une population qui a perdu confiance dans la capacité de ses institutions à garantir la protection des plus jeunes et de la jeunesse en général. Des institutions qui auraient oublié de prendre en compte les intérêts des consommateurs-utilisateurs (surtout des plus vulnérables). Qui auraient oublié le sens des responsabilités et de l'intérêt général au profit d'intérêts particuliers. Les profits des BIG Ones.